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THE SUPREME COURT, 1974 TERM
delineating the circumstances in which privacy will take prece-
dence over expression. It is clear that the Court's inability to
render an authoritative construction of a state statute 63 did not
compel a holding of facial invalidity rather than a declaration of
a per se rule followed by remand of Erznoznik's case. 4 Neither
method would remove or alter the text of an ordinance on the
books. 5 Both assume that primary actors will determine their
first amendment rights in light of the Court's latest opinions.
Thus neither method can claim to be a superior means of dis-
sipating the chilling effect of an overbroad law. Announcing a
per se rule should generally be preferred, however, because facial
invalidation deprives the state of the benefits of a law's permis-
sible applications, as well as preventing its impermissible ones.
66
Overbreadth review should therefore be employed only when the
Court is unable to formulate a satisfactory general rule of priv-
ilege. The Erznoznik Court's choice of overbreadth review, then,
signals a reluctance to forfeit doctrinal flexibility by announcing
a comprehensive rule governing the conflict between privacy and
expression. Its hesitation in defining obscenity as to minors sug-
gests a belief that reentry into an area recently committed to
states and localities would be inopportune and could indicate
concern that the Court's own obscenity decisions have failed to
provide workable standards.
G. Speech or Debate Clause
Reviewability of Congressional Committee Subpoenas. - The
speech or debate clause of the Constitution prohibits the ques-
tioning of congressmen "in any other Place" "for any Speech
or Debate in either House." I The Supreme Court has decided
only nine cases involving this clause, with seven of those de-
cisions occurring in the past decade.2 In its. most recent decision,
" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
" See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (remanding for state
courts to apply definition of libel announced in earlier case).
651 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.07, at 24 (C.
Sands ed. X972); 0. FIELD, THE E FECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE 10
(1935)-
" See 95 S. Ct. at 2276 ("invalidation [which] may result in unnecessary
interference with a state regulatory program").
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
2 Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813 (i975); Doe
v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 3o6 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6 (1972);
United States v. Brewster, 4o8 U.S. 5o2 (2972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486 (i96q); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (x967); United States v.
19751
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Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund,3 the Court held
that the members and chief counsel of a congressional subcom-
mittee were immune from a suit to enjoin enforcement of a sub-
poena issued by the subcommittee and alleged to infringe first
amendment rights. Although this result is directly supported
by prior authority, the opinion of the Court suggests that a new
interpretation of the speech or debate clause may be emerging.
United States Servicemen's Fund (USSF), a nonprofit as-
sociation, established coffeehouses near military bases and aided
in the publication of newspapers for military personnel. Through
these operations, USSF claimed to provide dissenting service-
men with a forum for expressing opposition to the war in Viet-
nam.4 As part of a wide-ranging inquiry into domestic sub-
versive activities, 5 the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Se-
curity, chaired by Senator Eastiand, issued a subpoena duces
tecum to a bank with which USSF maintained an account, di-
recting it to produce all records pertaining to that account.
Before the bank complied, USSF brought an action against
the subcommittee's members and chief counsel, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the subpoena was invalid and an in-
junction against its enforcement.' USSF's principal contention
was that the subpoenaed records would disclose the identity of
its members and the donors of its funds, chilling their first
amendment rights to associate and to advocate controversial po-
sitions.' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit accepted USSF's constitutional claim and rejected the sub-
committee's defense that the suit was barred by the speech or
debate clause."
The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Burger's majority
Johnson, 383 U.S. I6g (x966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (ig5i) (dic-
tum); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 3o3 U.S. x68 (i88i).
a95 S. Ct. x813 (I975).
4 See id. at 1816-17.
'The inquiry was authorized by S. Res. 341, gist Cong., 2d Sess. (i97o),
which directed the subcommittee to study the operation of the Internal Security
Act of I95O, 5o U.S.C. §§ 78x-98 (1970).
6 95 S. Ct. at 1817-i8.
'See id. In support of its contention, USSF relied on such cases as Gibson v.
Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (3963); Louisiana ex rel.
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (ig6i); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (196o); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd per curiarn, 393 U.S.
14 (1968). See joint Brief of Respondents at o-i7, Eastland v. United States
Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813 (1975). These cases recognized that, in certain
circumstances, associations have a protected first amendment interest in prevent-
ing disclosure of their membership.
8488 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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opinion I first stated the established doctrine that activities of
congressmen that fall within the "legitimate legislative sphere"
are protected from judicial interference by the speech or debate
clause."0 The Court ruled that the actions of the defendants-
authorizing and issuing the subpoena- fell within this sphere,
since those actions were taken in the exercise of the congressional
power of investigation. Because of the absolute nature of the
clause, the Court declined to consider USSF's claims that is-
suance of the subpoena was motivated by an improper purpose
and that enforcement of the subpoena would infringe its first
amendment rights.'
As Justice Marshall indicated in a concurring opinion,' 2 the
Court's decision follows directly from the first speech or debate
clause case, Kilbourn v. Thompson,3 and the recent case of
Gravel v. United States.4 Kilbourn involved the arrest, at the
direction of the House of Representatives, of a person who had
failed to comply with a congressional subpoena. In Kilbourn's suit
for false arrest, the Supreme Court held the congressmen who
had ordered the arrest immune from suit on the ground that
the speech or debate clause protects not just debate, but "things
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members
in relation to the business before it." 1 The Kilbourn Court
did not dismiss the suit entirely, however; the suit was allowed
to proceed against the Sergeant at Arms of the House, a minor
functionary who had carried out the arrest.16 Thus, although
Kilbourn established that the validity of a congressional act can-
not be questioned in a suit against congressmen acting in their
legislative capacities, it does allow judicial review of that issue
in a suit against a functionary. The vitality of Kilbourn's dis-
tinction has been reaffirmed by the Court in recent speech or
debate clause cases.'
7
°The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Douglas dissented.
10 See 95 S. Ct. at 182o-21, citing cases cited at note 2 supra.
"See 95 S. Ct. at 1821-25.
1d. at 1826-29.
13 xo3 U.S. 168 (I88i).
14408 U.S. 6o6 (1972).
is xo3 U.S. at 204. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 625 (2972)
(clause applies to activities that are "an integral part of the deliberative and
communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House
proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within
the jurisdiction of either House").
16 io3 U.S. at 205.
17 See, e.g., Doe v. McMiUan, 412 U.S. 3o6, 314-16 (1973) (congressmen and
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In Servicemen's Fund, the defendant chief counsel of the
subcommittee might have been considered a functionary against
whom suit could proceed under Kilbourn. In the Gravel case,
however, the Court had found that some congressional aides are
so closely associated with congressmen that they should be
treated as the legislators' "alter egos" for purposes of the speech
or debate clause. 18 The Servicemen's Fund Court placed the sub-
committee counsel in this category, noting that the plaintiffs'
complaint had not distinguished between the counsel's actions
and those of the subcommittee members. 19 Because there were
no defendants other than the members and counsel, the Court
could apply the absolute terms of the speech or debate clause
and avoid the difficult issue presented by the conflict between
the congressional need for information and the plaintiffs' irst
amendment interests.
Although the result in Servicemen's Fund is readily explained
by precedent, the Chief Justice's opinion suggests that the Court
is willing to reconsider the continued permissibility of suits
against functionaries challenging congressional actions. The
Court's new test is apparently that, when actions directed by
Congress or its committees are "essential to legislating," 20 their
validity cannot be inquired into by the judiciary. Adoption
of this proposition does not seem warranted by the functions
the speech or debate clause was intended to serve.
The historical purpose of the speech or debate clause 21 was
to allow individual congressmen to perform their duties, free from
fear that their decisions would become the subject of a civil or
criminal action.22 Without extensive congressional freedom of
aides immune for preparation and publication of committee report alleged to
violate privacy rights; suit allowed against Public Printer and Superintendent of
Documents); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 5oi-o6 (1969) (congressmen
immune for voting to exclude elected representative; suit allowed against House
Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper).
18408 U.S. at 616-17.
1" See 95 S. Ct. at 1823. A distinction between the actions of members of a
subcommittee and their counsel formed the basis for holding the counsel unpro-
tected by the speech or debate clause in Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967). See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 619-20 (1972).
20See 95 S. Ct. at 1825-26. Although the phrase "essential to legislating"
appears in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 62X (1972), Servicemen's Fund
seems to give the words a new significance.
21 For accounts of the history of the privilege in England and the United
States, see Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and the Separation of
Powers, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1i3, 112o-44 (973); Cella, The Doctrine of Legis-
lative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and Debate, 2 SUFeoLx U. L. REv. i, 3-3o
(1968).
22See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 618 (1972) ("fundamental pur-
pose" of clause is "freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight
IVol. 89:47
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speech, it was thought that the deliberations of Congress might
be impaired.3 Without protection from criminal prosecutions
by the executive branch, the ability of congressmen to function
independently could be destroyed.24
The extensive personal immunity granted by the clause, how-
ever, has never been thought to shield exercises of congressional
power from judicial review.2 5  The Constitution allocates only
certain powers to Congress, and a judicial determination of
whether those powers have been exceeded is normally consid-
ered vital in preserving a check on the legislature and a balance
between the powers of the three branches of government. 26 Such
that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator"); cf. Coffin v.
Coffin, 4 Mass. i, 27 (1808) (state constitution) ("These privileges are thus
secured, not with the intention of protecting the members against prosecutions
for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by enabling their
representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions,
civil or criminal.").
23 James Wilson, a member of the committee that drafted the speech or debate
clause, see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 21, at 1139 n.138, stated:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to dis-
charge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful,
to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.
i THE WORKS OP JAMES WIISOn 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967), quoted in United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 50, 548 n.9 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. i6q, i79 (1966) ("The legislative
privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an unfriendly executive and
conviction by a hostile judiciary, ... ensur[es) the independence of the legis-
lature."); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 21, at 1121, ii44. The limited pur-
pose of the immunity granted by the speech or debate clause is underscored by
U.S. Co sT. art. I, § 5, which allows Congress to discipline its own members.
"
2 See Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1827
(1975) (Marshall, J., concurring); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 313-17 (I973) ;
id. at 326-27 (Douglas, J., concurring); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
618-2X (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 5oi, 508, 524-25 (1972);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503, 505 (1969); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 379-80 (i95i) (Black, J., concurring); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 1o3
U.S. 68 (W88i).21See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (power of courts
to interpret the Constitution is essential "to the basic concept of separation of
powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite
government"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 211 (1962) ("Deciding ...whether
the action of (another) branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed
[to it by the Constitution] ... is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate in-
terpreter of the Constitution."); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137,
176-77 (1803) ("The powers of the legislature are defined and limited . . . . It
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."). The Court has clearly indicated that the speech or debate clause
was not meant to alter the basic constitutional balance of powers. See United
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 5oi, 508 (1972) ("Our speech or debate privilege
was designed to preserve legislative independence, not supremacy. Our task ...
1975]
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a determination is entirely distinct from holding a congressman
accountable for a speech or inquiring into his motivations for a
vote, the types of situations that the speech or debate clause was
designed to prevent." The Supreme Court has clearly recog-
nized this distinction in the past, stating that, when constitutional
rights can be protected 28
without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes
underlying such an act [and] [n]o threat to legislative inde-
pendence [is] posed, . . . Speech or Debate Clause protection
[does] not attach.
The majority opinion in Servicemen's Fund took a different
and somewhat novel view of the purpose of the speech or debate
clause. Rather than directing attention to whether judicial re-
view of the subcommittee subpoena would necessitate inquiry
into motive or infringe on legislators' independence, the Court
concerned itself with the disruption and delay of the legislative
process that judicial review of the subpoena might cause. In one
of several references to this problem,29 the Chief Justice wrote:80
This case illustrates vividly the harm that judicial inter-
ference may cause. A legislative inquiry has been frustrated for
nearly five years during which the Members and their aide have
been obliged to devote time to consultation with their counsel
concerning the litigation, and have been distracted from the
purpose of their inquiry. The Clause was written to prevent the
need to be confronted by such "questioning" ....
The Chief Justice's reluctance to tolerate the inescapable delay
and disruption caused by judicial review suggests that the im-
port of Servicemen's Fund is not simply that particular defend-
ants were immune from suit, but rather that pre-enforcement
review of a congressional subpoena may not be available at all."
is to apply the Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legis-
lature without altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of
Government."). See also Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 21, at x,75.
2See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972) ("ET]he Speech
or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular
course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts ....
[Blut [the privilege is] narrow enough to guard against ...excesses ... .);
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 16, i8o, 185 (i966) (speech or debate clause
forecloses inquiry into congressman's motivations).
28 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 621 (1972). See also Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 1827 (x975) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486, 505 (x969).2 1See 95 6. Ct. at 182X, 1824-25 n.6, X825 & n-17.30 d. at 1825.
21 Three members of the Servicemen's Fund majority had previously written
[Vol. 89:47
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The Chief Justice's brief discussion of Kilbourn is consistent
with this suggestion. He contended that review of the arrest in
Kilbourn was available only because the arrest was not "essential
to legislating." 32 By contrast, he apparently considered a "rou-
tine subpoena" to be essential and thus immune from judicial
review, regardless of the identity of the defendants.33
Justice Marshall, concurring in the judgment of the Court,
disagreed with the majority's characterization of Kilbourn.34
As previous cases had noted, the resolution authorizing the arrest
in Kilbourn "was clearly legislative in nature." " Hence the
decision to allow suit against the Sergeant at Arms had rested,
not on the position that the arrest was inessential to the legisla-
tive process, but rather on a concern that the speech or debate
clause not be used to deny entirely judicial review of the arrest.
Justice Marshall emphasized that review of the constitutionality
of the subpoena at issue in Servicemen's Fund should be available
in a suit against other persons acting at the direction of the sub-
committee or its counsel.3
6
opinions suggesting a rejection of the Kilbourn doctrine. In Doe v. McMillan,
412 U.S. 306 ('973), Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
dissented from the Court's decision that the speech or debate clause did not pro-
tect the Public Printer and the Superintendent of Documents, who printed and
distributed a committee report at the direction of Congress, see id. at 3,5-17.
The Chief Justice's separate opinion emphasized that the Printer "is simply the
extended arm of the Congress itself, charged by law with executing congressional
commands," id. at 331, a description that would have applied as well to the
Sergeant at Arms in Kilbourn. Justice Blackmun's opinion, in which the Chief
Justice joined, stressed that the committee report represented "legitimate legisla-
tive activity," which should be protected at each step in the sequence from
authorization to printing and distribution. Id. at 332. Justice Rehnquist, joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Blackmun, argued that, if mem-
bers of Congress would have been immune for publishing and distributing the
report, then functionaries carrying out these congressional directives should also
be immune. See id. at 342. It is interesting to note that Justice Stewart later
joined Justice Marshall's concurrence in Servicemen's Fund, which emphasized the
importance of the Kilbourn functionary doctrine.
32 95 S. Ct. at 1824, quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 621 (1972).
s See 95 S. Ct. at 1824.
" See id. at 1827-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
5 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 6o6, 618 (1972), quoted in Doe v. Mc-
Millan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 n.9 (1973).
" See 95 S. Ct. at 1826-29 (Marshall, J., concurring). The fact that Justice
Marshall felt compelled to write a concurrence discussing an issue not presented
in the case-the permissibility of suit against potential defendants not then
before the Court -indicates a concern that the Servicemen's Fund majority
opinion might be taken as a rejection of the Kilbourn functionary doctrine.
In a brief dissenting opinion in Servicemen's Fund, Justice Douglas argued
that a balancing test should always be employed when constitutional rights are
implicated, regardless of whether the defendants are congressmen or functionaries.
See 95 S. Ct. at 1829. This position has the advantage of not allowing the avail-
IC975]
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Although it is true that pre-enforcement judicial review of
a congressional subpoena in a suit against a functionary will de-
lay the legislative process, it seems unlikely that the duration of
this delay would exceed that entailed if similar issues were raised
in a criminal trial for contempt of Congress. When a subpoena
is directed to a person wishing to challenge it, he may refuse to
comply and litigate his objections if prosecuted for contempt.8 7
As a result, Congress is denied the information sought until the
objections are adjudicated.
To be sure, a rule that a contempt prosecution should pro-
vide the exclusive forum for litigating the validity of a subpoena 8
may provide a useful filter against frivolous challenges that would
not be available if pre-enforcement review were allowed. 3 If
a committee fears the possibility of frivolous objections to its
subpoena, however, in many cases it will be able to force chal-
lenges to be litigated in a contempt proceeding merely by directing
the subpoena to the person wanting to challenge it, rather than
to a third party.40 Where such redirection is not possible, it may
be questioned whether the desire to reduce frivolous challenges
justifies foreclosing all judicial review.
Despite the legitimacy of the Chief Justice's concern with
disruption of the legislative process, his incorporation of this
concern into the speech or debate clause seems unfortunate. In de-
termining whether to grant pre-enforcement review of congres-
sional subpoenas, a court should consider not only the congres-
ability of review to depend on the fortuity of locating a proper functionary, but
it might make it more difficult in practice to maintain the distinction between
holding congressmen accountable for their speeches or votes and determining
whether congressional powers have been exceeded, see pp. 135-36 supra.
" See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 36o U.S. xo9 (1959); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
38 See 95 S. Ct. at 1824-25 n.i6. It is the availability of contempt proceedings
as a forum for litigation of challenges to the validity of subpoenas that has war-
ranted the courts' refusal to provide pre-enforcement review. See United States
v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (197x) (grand jury subpoena); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (i94o) (same); Sanders v. McClellan, 463
F.2d 894, 899-900 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (congressional committee subpoena); Ansara
v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751, 753-54 (D.C. Cir. X971) (same). When the contempt
mechanism has not been available, the Supreme Court has recognized that some
pre-enforcement review should be provided. See Eastland v. United States Serv-
icemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813, 182o n.14 (1975); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 691-92 (i974); Pernman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 (xgx8).
"
9 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 69o-9i (,974) (dictum); United
States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (197).
"Thus in Servicemen's Fund the subpoena could have been directed to USSF.
USSF asserted that it had in its possession the information that the subcommittee
sought from the bank. See Joint Brief of Respondents at 4, Eastland v. United
States Servicemen's Fund, 95 S. Ct. 1813 (,975).
[Vol. 89:47
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sional interest, but also the countervailing interest in ensuring
that first amendment rights are not violated and the alternative
courses open to Congress to avoid frivolous challenges to its sub-
poenas. Discussion of these issues under the rubric of the speech
or debate clause needlessly obfuscates the policies at stake and
leads to a disregard of first amendment interests. This absolutist
position is not warranted by either past cases or the purposes of
the speech or debate clause.
H. State Action
Utility Terminations. - Because the prohibitions of the
fourteenth amendment apply only to the states,1 courts often
have to determine when arguably private action should be treated
as state action for purposes of the amendment.' In Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.,3 the Supreme Court held that where
a heavily regulated utility, enjoying a territorial monopoly in
the provision of electricity, terminates a customer's service for
alleged nonpayment, such a termination does not constitute state
action.
When her electrical service was cut off by Metropolitan Ed-
ison, Catherine Jackson sued the company under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that termination without prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard had deprived her of property without
due process of law.' The district court granted the utility's mo-
t See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The fourteenth amendment
provides in part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
2 See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (,972); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See generally Black, The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes
for a Revised Opinion, 1Xo U. PA. L. Rav. 473 (1962); Karst & Horowitz, Reitman
v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, i967 SUP. CT. REv. 39;
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXs L. Rav. 347 (1963).
3419 U.S. 345 (3974).
442 U.S.C. § 1983 (I97o) grants a private right of action against anyone
who, "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory," deprives any person "of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws." The Jackson Court treated the require-
ment that the action be taken under color of state law as identical to the state
action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of this prob-
lem, see Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, i61 (6th Cir. 1973).
' Jackson claimed that she was granted an entitlement of service, within the
1975]
